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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff-Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
JASON WOODS AND 
CHARLES DION, ] 
Defendant-Appellants 
) Case No: 960269-CA 
) Priority :(2) 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROCEDURE OF INVESTIGATING ALL OUT OF STATE MOTORISTS 
BASED UPON THE SINGLE MOVEMENT OF A VEHICLE BECAUSE OUT OF 
STATE DRIVERS MAY BE IMPAIRED IS UNREASONABLE. 
The State in the Brief mischaracterizes the position of 
the Appellants as claiming error based upon a claim of only 
pretext stop. The Defendants submit that the car in which 
they were riding was stopped even though there was never any 
objective traffic violation. 
1 
The stop took place because of the unique investigatory 
procedure of the Sheriff's Deputy conducting drug 
investigations of the highway. The Deputy stops out-of-
state vehicles on the slightest movement even between 
eastbound lanes of travel. The Appellants were stopped 
before there was any reasonable probable cause of the 
violation traffic regulations. 
The Appellant draws attention to the attempted 
justification by the State in the Statement of Facts set 
forth in the Appellee's Brief. The Appellee admits that the 
evidence was introduced at the hearing that "because 8 0 to 
90 percent of traffic accidents on that stretch of road (the 
main route between Las Angeles and Denver) are one car 
accidents caused by a sleepy or intoxicated driver, [Deputy 
Barney's] greatest concern is to watch for drivers that may 
be sleepy or intoxicated", further "Deputy Barney sees tired 
drivers in the early morning when the Appellants were 
operating their vehicle". (See Appellees brief, page 5.) 
The State ignores the issue raised by this appeal as to 
whether the Court is going to essentially overrule the State 
2 
v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1989) and find that one 
slight movement is weaving or constitutes a motion, erratic 
driving which is indicative of an sleepy or intoxicated 
driver. Here, the Deputy immediately pursued and stopped 
the vehicle without further observation of driving pattern 
based upon his generalized investigative techniques. The 
Deputy works under assumption that most drivers traveling 
form out of the county with out of State plates would be 
tired and this rationale allows him to stop a majority of 
any vehicle on the stretch of interstate highway which he 
patrols by special assignment. 
In State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1994), the 
facts leading to suppression of a search and seizure by the 
same Deputy were as follows: 
On March 15, 1991, at approximately 11:15 a.m., Deputy 
Phil Barney was traveling west on 1-70 when he noticed 
Bello's eastbound pickup truck temporarily drift so that it 
straddled both eastbound lanes of traffic. Barney turned his 
vehicle around, activated his video recorder, and pursued 
the truck in order to stop it and determine whether the 
driver of the vehicle was under the influence of alcohol, 
drowsy, or otherwise impaired. For the approximately two 
miles that Barney followed the truck, he observed no further 
problems that might indicate an impaired driver, and he 
stated at the hearing on the motion to suppress that there 
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were extreme wind conditions that day that might account for 
the temporary drifting of the truck into the other lane.... 
Unlike the State's in this appeal, the State in Bello 
contended that when Bello's truck briefly crossed the center 
line of the eastbound lanes and therefore the Defendant 
violated a statute requiring that a vehicle be operated "as 
nearly as practical entirely within a single lane." Utah 
Code Ann. 41-6-61(1) (1953). 
This Court should also find that the initial suspicion, 
which was triggered by a minor driving aberration, was not 
corroborated, the Appellants did not violate Utah Code 
Annotated 41-6-61 (1) by "weaving once" around the curve. 
Both lanes of the roadway travel in the same direction and 
the road was curving down and around a hill. The State has 
not proven an actual traffic violation and no reasonable 
proof of a possible future violation before a vehicle would 
be stopped by an officer conducting a traffic infestation. 
Therefore, this Court should find there was no objective 
basis to stop under Utah traffic laws and there was no 
reason to immediately stop to check for possible tired 
4 
drivers.(The Defendant testier they had stayed overnight in 
Beaver, Utah) 
In reviewing the legality of a traffic stop, this 
consider two questions: "[W]hether the officer's action was 
justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place." Terry v. Ohio, 3 92 U.S. 1, 
20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968); accord State v. Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994);and, State v. Patefield, 303 
Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (CA, 11/7/96). The officer never observed 
any pattern of driving and after one brief observation drove 
his vehicle through the median and immediately turned on his 
overhead lights to effect detention. Morever, the 
Appellant's car came within a very short distance of the 
patrol car parked in the middle of the road and the Deputy 
was able to see the driver was alert and view him at close 
range. 
The Court should not abandon the analysis determining 
whether or not the vehicle should be stopped and adopt an 
objective, critical analysis of the stop. Under such a 
5 
critical analysis, the Appellant submits that the State 
failed to prove the stop not based upon objective evidence 
of a violation of the Utah State Traffic Code. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT "COMMUNITY CARETAKER" LEGAL 
PRINCIPLES TO RANDOM STOPS MADE TO CHECK POSSIBLE 
TIRED DRIVERS BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT 
The Defendants raised in the Memorandum In Support Of 
Motion To Suppress, filed with the District Court, the same 
issue of whether the only logical basis to stop a vehicle 
must based upon the deputies policy be as a community 
caretaker stopping possibly tired drivers. (See Defendant's 
Post-Hearing Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Suppress 
file in January, 1996.) 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
In conclusion, the Defendant's respectfully 
request that the Court reverse the denial of the Motion to 
Suppress. The Defendants vehicle should not have been 
stopped and should have been allowed to drive through Sevier 
County, Utah without being arbitrarily stopped for a drug 
investigation without probable cause of a violation of the 
Traffic Code merely because they were in an out-of-state 
car. The Appellant requests the Court enter an order 
reversing the District Court's denial of the Motion to 
Suppress. 
DATED this day of December, 1996. 
RANDALL GAITHER 
Attorney for the 
Defendant-Appellants 
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